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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











JON S. CORZINE, Governor New Jersey;  
GEORGE HAYMAN, Commissioner - DOC, et al;  
DEVON BROWN, Past Commissioner - DOC, et al;  
KEVIN M. RYAN, Commissioner - DHS, et al;  
ALAN G. KAUFMAN, Director, Division of Mental Health Services;  
JOHN E. MAIN, Chief Executive Officer - DMHS, et al;  
WILLIAM F. PLANTIER, Director of Operations, DOC;  
GRACE ROGERS, Administrators - ADTC & STUs;  
PAUL LAGANA, Assistant Administrator - STUs;  
GLEN FERGUSON, Clinical Program Director;  
MERRILL MAIN, Director of Psychology Dept.; 
JOHN DOES 1-40; JANE DOES 1-40, Fictitious Names 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 2-07-cv-01212) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 21, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 









 Joseph Aruanno appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, which granted summary judgment for the Defendants in 
Aruanno’s civil rights action.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
I. 
 Aruanno is civilly confined at the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) in New Jersey 
pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”).  The appeal before 
our Court has its origins in a complaint filed in 2007 by Aruanno and four other 
plaintiffs.  Upon screening the complaint, which raised numerous claims regarding their 
confinement, the District Court dismissed some of the claims with prejudice for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Dkt. ##14, 15.1   
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent 
 
1 The Court dismissed:  (1) claims that the SVPA violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex 
Post Facto clauses of the United States Constitution; (2) claims that the SVPA was 
overbroad and vague; (3) claims that there was a federal constitutional right to a jury trial 
in civil commitment proceedings; and (4) claims that treatment provided by Defendants 
violated the Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights not to incriminate themselves.  As 
Aruanno does not raise any of these claims in his appellate brief, we will not discuss 
them further.  See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004) (issue waived 
unless party raises it in opening brief). 
3 
 
 About a year later, the complaint was consolidated with an ongoing class action 
suit, Alves v. Ferguson, D.N.J. Civ. No. 01-cv-00789.  That case was settled in 2012, see 
Dkt. #145-9, and although some of the plaintiffs (including Aruanno) objected, we 
affirmed the settlement on appeal.  See Alves v. Main, 559 F. App’x 151 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Aruanno then filed a motion in this case (D.N.J. 07-cv-01212), asking that the matter be 
deconsolidated from Alves and reinstated.  The District Court found that the Alves matter 
“resolved all claims regarding the adequacy of the STU’s mental health programs,” but 
that the settlement had not “encompassed all of [Aruanno’s] claims against officials of 
the Department of Corrections (‘DOC’) concerning facilities, living conditions, and 
security measures at the STU.”  Dkt. #76.  The Court thus deconsolidated the matter from 
Alves and reinstated the non-settled claims to the docket.  Id.2 
 Following the deconsolidation, the remaining claims were:  “Plaintiff’s various 
Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement and equal protection claims (based on 
his inability to have a job absent treatment participation, the facilities[’] phone and 
computer policies, the use of a Modified Activities Program (“MAP”) status3 as a form of 
                                              
2 All plaintiffs except Aruanno withdrew from the suit or were dismissed. 
 
3 Under the MAP program, privileges are curtailed when residents’ “internal controls 
deteriorate such that they pose a threat to the safety of Residents [or] staff, or [their 
actions] warrant increased external control[].”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 7 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The program includes four levels of restricted, unescorted movement.  
The resident is restricted to his room, tier, wing, or “program,” depending on “apparent 
danger.”  Dkt. #145-7 at 43.  Treatment personnel review the resident’s MAP status, and 
levels of restriction may be decreased until the resident is returned to the general 
population with all privileges reinstated.  Id. at 43-47. 
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discipline, and the prison-like conditions at the STU facility), Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 
Amendment deprivation of property claims, and Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims for 
improper searches of his property.”  Dkt. #154 at 21.  The parties conducted discovery, 
including a deposition of Aruanno. 
  The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.  Aruanno filed a short 
counter-motion for summary judgment, but he did not refer to documents in the record or 
provide a statement of material facts.  Rather, he argued that there were problems with 
discovery and that the District Court should have appointed counsel.  In its opinion, the 
District Court denied Aruanno’s counter-motion as “woefully inadequate,” but declined 
to treat the Defendants’ statement of facts as undisputed.  Instead, the Court construed 
Aruanno’s deposition testimony as his statement of facts.  The Court described that 
testimony at length.  See Dkt. #154 at 8-14. 
 The Court then examined each of the remaining claims.  The Court determined 
that summary judgment for the Defendants was warranted as to each of the claims 
because the conditions did not violate the Constitution, because the Defendants were not 
aware of the underlying allegations, or because the allegations concerned incidents that 
were not within the time-frame of the complaint.  Aruanno timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 We review the District Court’s order granting summary judgment de novo and 
review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of 
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Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011).  We will affirm if our review reveals that “there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We agree with the District Court that the 
Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   
 In civil rights actions, supervisors are not vicariously liable for their subordinates’ 
acts.  See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016).  As the District Court 
noted, Aruanno testified at his deposition that he was not aware of any personal 
involvement of any of the Defendants in the name calling, searches, verbal abuse, or 
alleged excessive uses of force mentioned in the complaint or at his deposition.    
 Supervisory liability is allowed, however, if the plaintiff shows that the 
supervisors:  (1) “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly 
caused the constitutional harm”; or (2) “they participated in violating plaintiff's rights, 
directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and 
acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.”  Id.  As for the specific, discrete incidents 
alleged by Aruanno (as opposed to his claims addressing general conditions), only one 
occurred prior to the filing of the complaint (Aruanno alleges he was confronted and 
threatened by a guard who was smuggling contraband into the facility).  Dkt. #154 at 24.  
As Aruanno conceded that the Defendants were not aware of that particular incident until 
6 
 
his complaint was filed, Defendants could not have “had knowledge of and acquiesced in 
[the guard’s] violation[].”  See Parkell, 833 F.3d at 330.4   
 Aruanno’s claims that general conditions violated his constitutional rights might 
be construed as alleging that the supervisors failed to train, supervise, or discipline their 
subordinates.  But Aruanno did not show that the Defendants were aware of the 
violations alleged in his complaint, either before or after they occurred.  See Brown v. 
Muhlenberg Tp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 
U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (successful failure-to-train claim requires “evidence that the need 
for more or different training was so obvious and so likely to lead to the violation of 
constitutional rights that the policymaker’s failure to respond amounts to deliberate 
indifference”).  In sum, the District Court properly determined that Aruanno had failed to 
establish any plausible claim of supervisory liability.  D. Ct. Op. at 20-23.5    
                                              
4 Although the District Court granted summary judgment on Aruanno’s claims regarding 
destruction of property because there is a post-deprivation remedy, see Dkt. #154 at 22 
(citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984)), we note that summary judgment 
was also warranted on those claims because Aruanno did not show that Defendants were 
aware of those incidents. 
   
5 Also, the Court properly declined to consider many of the other allegations Aruanno 
made at his deposition, including the destruction of property claims, as those allegations 
involved events that had occurred after the complaint was filed, and the complaint had 
not been amended.  Aruanno argues in his brief here that the time frame should have 
extended to the time of his deposition, but he did not amend his complaint in the District 
Court.  Thus, the District Court properly determined that the applicable time frame was 
the two-year period preceding the 2007 filing of the complaint.  See Dique v. N.J. State 
Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (§ 1983 claim arising in New Jersey subject to 




 As for Aruanno’s more general conditions of confinement claims, even if 
Defendants had been aware of those conditions, Aruanno did not show that the STU 
deprived him of his liberty interest in safe conditions and his right to freedom from undue 
bodily restraints.6  See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982).  Nor did he 
show that any of the conditions constituted “punishment” in violation of the Due Process 
Clause.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (detainee may not be punished 
prior to adjudication of guilt with due process of law); Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 
231-32 (3d Cir. 2008) (restriction is not punishment if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate governmental objective).  While the MAP system is “punitive,” in the larger 
sense of the word, the “punishment” is not imposed because of the conduct that resulted 
in the resident’s commitment.  Instead, it is imposed because of some conduct within the 
STU that endangers either the other residents or staff, or the resident himself.  See 
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473-74 (2015) (to show that condition is 
“punitive,” plaintiff must provide “objective evidence that the challenged governmental 
action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is 
excessive in relation to that purpose”).  As the MAP system is reasonably related to the 
                                              
6 Although Aruanno states in his brief here that “a key issue is being denied a law library, 





institution’s goals of security and treatment, it is not “punishment” in the legal sense.7  
See id.   
 The District Court also properly granted summary judgment on Aruanno’s equal 
protection claims.  “To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must present 
evidence that s/he has been treated differently from persons who are similarly situated.”  
Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 337 (3d Cir. 2010).  And if the complained-of 
“action does not burden a fundamental Constitutional right or target a suspect class, the 
challenged classification must be upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable state of 
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”  Id. (quoting Doe v. Pa. 
Bd. Prob. and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2008)).  Aruanno’s equal protection 
claim was based on his belief that the conditions for sexually violent predators should be 
the same as those for those who have been committed for mental disabilities.  But as the 
District Court noted, there are rational reasons for different treatment of sexually violent 
predators and civilly committed mental patients at other facilities.  Cf. Taylor v. San 
Diego Cty., 800 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2015) (persons civilly committed under 
California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act not similarly situated to those civilly 
committed under another California law regarding commitment of persons who are a 
danger to themselves or others, or who are gravely disabled); see also In re Civil  
                                              
7 The District Court noted that the program is “designed to control anti-social or 
dangerous behavior,” and “to help the STU resident to regain his self-control and avoid 





Commitment of E.D., 803 A.2d 166, 170 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“In enacting 
the SVPA, the Legislature recognized that under the existing involuntary commitment 
statutes, persons were subject to commitment only if they were mentally ill, while other 
individuals who suffered from mental abnormalities or personality disorders which did 
not qualify as a mental illness under the general civil commitment legislation, presented a 
similar, if not greater, danger to society.”) (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4–27.25(a) and (b)). 
 As for Aruanno’s claims that the refusal to provide him with a job violated his 
constitutional rights, the District Court properly concluded, as we have before in other 
cases brought by Aruanno, see Aruanno v.Velez, 500 F. App’x 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2012), 
and Aruanno v. John/Jane Does 1-10, 536 F. App’x 167, 169 (3d Cir. 2013), that the fact 
that the STU denies Aruanno a job because he refuses treatment is not a violation of his 
constitutional rights.  Cf. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35-36 (2002) (transfer of prisoner 
who refuses to participate in sexual abuse treatment program to more restrictive 
environment with limited work and wage opportunities does not violate Fifth 
Amendment).  The District Court also properly rejected Aruanno’s claim that he should 
be able to start his own business in confinement, as allowing residents to do so could 




 For the above reasons, and those explained by the District Court, we will affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.8 
 
                                              
8 Aruanno’s motion for appointment of a legal guardian is denied.  Despite his 
confinement, the alleged deprivation of legal materials, and his mental issues, Aruanno 
has managed to make numerous filings in the District Court and this Court.  He is a 
frequent litigator, having filed around 50 appeals in this Court.  His filings are 
understandable and sufficiently apprise the Court of the issues to be resolved.  Although 
Aruanno claims he is “incompetent,” we have in the past affirmed a decision that found 
no evidence that Aruanno is legally incompetent, and Aruanno has not presented us with 
any new evidence of ineptitude.  See Aruanno v. Davis, 168 F. Supp. 3d 719, 724 (D.N.J. 
2016), aff’d, No. 16-1855, 2017 WL 619993 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2017).  And as we have 
previously informed Aruanno, we are aware of no legal support for his contention that 
appointment of an attorney is required under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  See 
Aruanno v. Caldwell, 637 F. App’x 675, 677 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016).  For the same reasons, 
we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decisions to deny Aruanno 
appointment of counsel or a legal guardian.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (court’s decision to deny appointment of counsel reviewed for abuse of 
discretion). 
